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POSTSCRIPT

ChiefJudge Judith Kaye, New York Court of Appeals
As the author of Brill v. City of New York, I have several
reactions to Professor Connors' article. First, I am impressed indeed, dazzled - by the author's comprehensive treatment of
his subject, and by his scholarship. As a CPLR "junkie," I find
all of the pathways to, from, in, out and around Brill downright
fascinating.
On another level, I feel both elation and dismay. Elation
because the Court's purpose in insisting upon strict compliance
with the clear statutory prescription was in part to underscore
the seriousness of deadlines and jog a delay-oriented culture
(see also Kihl v. Pfeffer2-). Thus, elation because the decision
sure was noticed!
But dismay quickly followed. So much effort, so much
lawyer and court time, so much client risk and expense, to
avoid simple compliance with a rule requiring that motions for
summary judgment be made no later than 120 days after the
filing of the note of issue, unless the movant can establish good
cause.
Professor Connors attributes this to "the adventuresome
nature of a healthy segment of the bar," and provides guidance
to the bench and bar in dealing with the timing requirement
for summary judgment motions. I can't avoid offering some
guidance of my own: just honor the deadlines, whether
statutory or court-ordered. There's lots of other room for
adventure in, and beyond, the law.
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